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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 19961 (“the Act”)
to “promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”2 While the Act covers several aspects
of the telecommunications industry, including broadcast services 3
and cable television,4 one of the most important goals of the Act centers on the local telephone sector. 5 The Act aims to foster local competition by “break[ing] down the local monopol[ies] . . . and . . . encourag[ing] competitors to enter the local telephone market.”6

* J.D., Florida State University, 2001; B.A., Southeastern Louisiana University,
1998. I would like to thank Joseph A. McGlothlin for his ideas and guidance but especially
for his kindness and patience. I would also like to thank my parents, Kristin and Kelly, for
their endless love and support.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.). Unless otherwise specified, all references in this Note to the “Act” refer only to Title I of the Act, the portion of the Act entitled “Telecommunications Services.”
2. Id. at preamble, 100 Stat. at 56.
3. See generally id. at tit. II, 100 Stat. at 107.
4. See generally id. at tit. III, 100 Stat. at 114.
5. See generally id. at tit. I, 110 Stat. at 56.
6. Duane McLaughlin, Note, FCC Jurisdiction over Local Telephone Under the 1996
Act: Fenced Off?, 97 COLUM . L. R EV . 2210, 2224 (1997).

831

832

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:831

This goal is a marked departure from traditional ideas surrounding the nature of local telephone service, which until the 1990s was
seen as “a natural monopoly.”7 Historically, local exchange carriers
(LECs) received exclusive franchises from the state. 8 The franchise
extended to the elements that comprise the physical network. 9 However, with the passage of the Act, Congress ended the tradition of
“state-sanctioned monopolies” in the local telephone industry.10 Congress perceived that undoing this long tradition held potentially
great benefits for consumers. It has been estimated that creating
competition in the local telephone market could save consumers as
much as $12 billion.11
But the task is a daunting one. Before the passage of the Act, the
local telephone market generated $95 billion in annual revenues and
was far and away “the largest and most concentrated sector of the
telecommunications market.”12 As a result of the barriers to local
competition, seven companies received eighty percent of the industry’s annual revenues.13 Additionally, ten providers that did not compete against one another in any local market controlled ninety-two
percent of the local telephone industry. 14
To ease newcomers’ entry into the market and prevent incumbents from engaging in anticompetitive behavior, the Act obligates
incumbents to share their networks with any requesting carrier.15 It
7. AT&T Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999); see also HENK BRANDS &
EVAN T. LEO, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS 16-19
(Artech House 1999) (explaining that where there is a natural monopoly, competition is
typically considered ineffective and uneconomical, but that regulation prohibiting market
entry makes it difficult to determine if the local telecommunications industry is a natural
monopoly).
8. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 371.
9. See id. These elements generally include “the local loops (wires connecting telephones to switches), the switches (equipment directing calls to their destinations), and the
transport trunks (wires carrying calls between switches) that constitute a local exchange
network.” Id.
10. Id.
11. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 2212 (citing Eleven Attorneys’ General Support
Competition in Local Multipoint Distribution Market, ANTITRUST REP. (National Ass’n of
Att’ys Gen., Wash., D.C.), May/June 1996, at 7); see also BRANDS & LEO, supra note 7, at
10-11 (noting that telecommunications services, including local and long-distance services,
wireless services, and pay phone services, generate a combined $220 billion annually, with
half of this coming from local services). Ninety-seven percent of the revenues from local
services are generated by incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). See id.
12. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 2211.
13. The seven largest ILECs are GTE (serving 20 million access lines); Sprint (7 million access lines); and the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs): Ameritech (20 million access lines), Bell Atlantic (40 million access lines), BellSouth (22 million access lines),
SBC (35 million access lines), and U.S. West (15 million access lines). See BRANDS & LEO,
supra note 7, at 11.
14. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 2211 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 4950 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 13).
15. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also AT&T Communications
Sys. v. Pacific Bell, 203 F.3d 1183, 1184 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that Congress imposed
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requires the parties to negotiate to form interconnection agreements
detailing their arrangement.16 If the parties cannot reach an agreement, they will be subject to arbitration by their controlling commission.17
The Act states that parties may appeal the arbitration’s outcome
to federal district courts. 18 But the Act is entirely silent as to the extent of the courts’ involvement, failing to designate which standard of
review to apply to determinations of state commissions. 19 Although
courts owe deference to federal agency interpretations, 20 there is no
established rule that delineates what level of deference courts should
give interpretations by state agencies on issues of federal law. Confusing matters further is the fact that jurisdiction over the Act is divided between the federal and state levels. In an attempt to sort out
the confusion, the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado,
in U.S. West Communications v. Hix,21 created a two-level standard
of review to be employed in these telecommunications cases, assigning the majority of issues an arbitrary-and-capricious standard.22
This Note argues that it is improper to apply a deferential standard to interpretations of federal law by state commissions arbitrating interconnection agreements; a de novo standard is more appropriate. Deference might be appropriate when the Federal Communi-

the duty for ILECs to share networks after “[r]ecognizing that competitors would have difficulty replicating local network facilities”).
16. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(1).
17. See id. § 252(b). The telecommunications carriers in each state are governed by a
state commission, typically referred to as the state’s public service commission or public
utilities commission. See BRANDS & LEO, supra note 7, at 8-9. When this Note discusses
the commissions or the state agencies charged with implementing certain provisions of the
Act, it is these entities to which the Note is referring.
18. Section 252(e)(6) provides:
In any case in which a State commission makes a determination [approving or
rejecting the agreement], any party aggrieved by such determination may bring
an action in an appropriate Federal district court to dete rmine whether the
agreement or statement meets the requirements of section 251 of this title and
this section.
Id.
19. Although the appropriate standard of review is a debated issue, the scope of review is undisputed—even though Congress failed to address it in the Act. See, e.g., U.S.
West Communs., Inc. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 1998 WL 350588, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 1998)
(stating that when evaluating interconnection agreements, the scope of review is confined
to the administrative record); U.S. West Communs., Inc. v. Hix, 986 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.
Colo. 1997) (citing U.S. v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 714 (1963)); see also Franklin
Savings Ass’n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1991)
(defining the scope of review as “the evidence the reviewing court will examine in reviewing an agency decision”).
20. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984).
21. 986 F. Supp. 13.
22. Id. at 19.
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cations Commission23 (FCC) has promulgated rules on the issue, because the state commission is likely to merely be implementing the
FCC’s rules. But when the FCC has not issued rules on ambiguous
provisions of the Act, state commissions cannot implement them
without interpreting them. Allowing state agencies to interpret the
Act would endanger its uniformity. There is need for consistent interpretation of federal acts among the states, especially in the telecommunications industry, where many of the same parties compete
in numerous states and debate the same issues in each of these
states.
Part II of this Note outlines important provisions of the Act, explaining how interconnection agreements are created and reviewed
by state commissions. Part III describes the relevant jurisdictional
issues, revealing that while the FCC has broad authority to regulate
in this area, important issues involving interpretation of the Act remain for which there are no helpful FCC rules. These issues have
been left for state commissions to resolve. Part III offers two examples, reciprocal compensation and pricing methodology, of areas in
which states have been actively interpreting the Act. Part IV then
turns to the appropriate standard of review federal courts ought to
employ in reviewing the decisions of state commissions, arguing that
the need for uniformity dictates the use of a de novo standard whenever state commissions interpret the Act. Part V describes the case
law on this issue, explaining how application of the Hix standard has
resulted in federal courts improperly deferring to state commissions
on important issues of federal law. This Note suggests that an appropriate standard of review would distinguish negotiated from arbitrated agreements. Part VI then concludes that the Hix standard
should be reformulated to require de novo review of arbitrated
agreements; if necessary, Congress should step in to explicitly provide for this by statute.
II. SPECIFICS OF THE ACT: CREATION AND REVIEW OF
INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS
The Act has two main components. First, it prohibits states from
“enforc[ing] laws that impede competition.”24 Second, it subjects incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) “to a host of duties intended
to facilitate market entry.”25 Among these duties is an obligation to
23. See AT&T Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 (1999). The FCC is the federal
agency with the “rulemaking authority to carry out the ‘provisions of this Act,’ which include [sections] 251 and 252,” the sections dealing with the local te lephone sector. Id. (refusing to agree with arguments that the FCC’s “rulemaking authority is limited to those
provisions dealing with purely interstate and foreign matters”).
24. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 371.
25. Id.
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offer carriers seeking entry to the market “nondiscriminatory access
to network elements.”26 The Act sets forth a number of important
standards:
[ILECs must provide access] on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252 of this title. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner
that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order
to provide such telecommunications service.27

An ILEC may fulfill the access requirement in one of three ways:
1) It can sell the requesting carrier telephone services at wholesale
rates that the requesting carrier can resell to consumers; 2) it can
lease unbundled network elements to the requesting carrier; or 3) it
can allow the requesting carrier to interconnect the requesting carrier’s facilities with its own. 28 The details of these arrangements are
negotiated between the parties at the market entrants’ request. The
resulting agreements are referred to as “interconnection agreements.”29
The Act requires that these agreements include provisions governing certain aspects of the arrangement between the ILEC and the
competitor, including resale, 30 number portability,31 dialing parity, 32
access to rights-of-way,33 and reciprocal compensation. 34 The agreement must also, at a minimum, “include a detailed schedule of itemized charges for interconnection and each service or network element
included in the agreement.”35

26. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
27. Id. § 251(c)(3). Section 252 specifies “[p]rocedures for negotiation, arbitration, and
approval of agreements.” Id. § 252.
28. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999) (citing § 251(c)).
29. See § 251(c)(1).
30. See § 251(b)(1). LECs have a “duty not to prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable
or discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the resale of its telecommunications se rvices.” Id.
31. See § 251(b)(2). LECs have a “duty to provide, to the extent technically feasible,
number portability in accordance with requirements prescribed by the Commission.” Id.
32. See § 251(b)(3). LECs have a “duty to provide dialing parity to competing providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service, and the duty to permit all
such providers to have nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers, operator services,
directory assistance, and directory listing, with no unreasonable dialing delays.” Id.
33. See § 251(b)(4). LECs have an imposing “duty to afford access to the poles, ducts,
conduits, and rights-of-way of such carrier to competing providers of telecommunications
services or rates, terms, and conditions that are consistent with section 224.” Id.
34. See § 251(b)(5). LECs must “establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for
the transport and termination of telecommunications.” Id.
35. 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1).
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Not all agreements are negotiated. Where the parties are unable
to reach an agreement, 36 industry newcomers looking to become
LECs may force ILECs “to negotiate . . . and to engage in a statesupervised mediation and arbitration process in order to produce an
interconnection agreement.”37 If the parties have not reached an
agreement within 135 days of the initial request for an interconnection agreement, then either party to the negotiation may petition the
state commission for arbitration on any unresolved issues. 38 When
arbitrating issues, the Act requires the commission to ensure that
the agreement meets the requirements of section 251, follows FCC
rules promulgated under section 251, and adheres to a pricing standard set forth in section 252(d).39 The states have nine months from
the initial request to resolve arbitrated issues. 40
The Act also requires the approval of the relevant state commission; this requirement applies to both arbitrated and negotiated
agreements. 41 “A State commission to which an agreement is submitted shall approve or reject the agreements, with written findings as
to any deficiencies.”42 When reviewing negotiated interconnection
agreements, the commission is only to consider whether the agreement “discriminates against a telecommunications carrier not a
party to the agreement”43 and whether “implementation of such
agreement . . . is not consistent with the public interest, convenience
and necessity.”44 After the parties submit their negotiated agreement, the state commission has ninety days to act to approve or reject the agreement; if the commission does not act, the negotiated
agreement will be deemed approved. 45
Even when the commission itself serves as an arbitrator, it must
still approve or reject the agreement upon completion. However, the
commission’s review here is of wider scope than that of arbitrated
agreements; it may reject arbitrated agreements for failure to meet
the requirements of section 251, follow the FCC rules, or adhere to
section 252(d)’s pricing standards. 46 With both negotiated and arbitrated agreements, in the absence of action by the state commission,
the FCC will determine whether to approve the agreement:

36.
(c)(1).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

The Act includes a provision requiring ILECs to negotiate in good faith. See § 251
McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 2226.
See § 252(b)(1).
See § 252(c).
See § 252(b)(4)(C).
See § 252(e)(1).
Id. § 252(e)(1).
Id. § 252(e)(2)(A)(i).
Id. § 252(e)(2)(A)(ii).
See § 252(e)(4).
Id. § 252(e)(B).
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If a State commission fails to act to carry out its responsibility under [section 252,] . . . then the [FCC] shall issue an order preempting the State commission’s jurisdiction of that proceeding or matter within 90 days after being notified (or taking notice) of such
failure, and shall assume responsibility of the State commission
under this section with respect to the proceeding or matter and act
for the State commission.47

Finally, the Act provides that parties can appeal a commission’s
final order approving or rejecting an agreement to federal district
court. 48 This is true for both negotiated and arbitrated agreements.
Unfortunately, the Act does not provide a standard of review. It does
not distinguish, with respect to judicial review, between negotiated
and arbitrated agreements. Nor does it distinguish between issues
governed by FCC rules and those issues that the FCC has not yet
addressed.
III. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES: WHO INTERPRETS THE ACT?
Jurisdictional issues have always been a complicated matter in
the telecommunications field. 49 The Act serves only to compound
these complications. It relies heavily on state commissions to oversee
interconnection agreements between the local market’s incumbent
monopolist and new entrants.50 Nonetheless, it delegates substantial
authority to the FCC as well. For example, in addition to granting
the FCC the authority to evaluate agreements when state commissions fail to do so, 51 the Act directs the FCC to establish rules regarding a number of other issues, including number portability 52 and access requirements to network elements. 53 It also authorizes the FCC
to create “impartial entities to administer telecommunications num-

47. Id. § 252(e)(5).
48. See § 252(e)(6); see also § 252(e)(4) (precluding a state court’s jurisdiction to review
the action of a State commission in approving or rejecting an agreement under section
252). But see Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 574 (7th Cir.
1999) (explaining that the parties can take issues involving interpretation of agreements—
matters of contract law —to state court), cert. granted in part sub. nom. Mathias v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1224 (Mar. 5, 2001).
49. See generally M. Anne Swanson & J.G. Harrington, The Future of Telecommunications (As We Know It)—Blurred Boundaries and Jurisdictional Conflicts, in 17TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & REGULATION 139, 146 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 584, 1999) (explaining
that in the telecommunications industry, companies are subject to regulatory requirements
on a routine basis at local, state, federal, and international levels), available at Westlaw,
584 PLI/Pat 139.
50. See Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications
Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999).
51. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5).
52. See id. § 251(b)(2).
53. See § 251(d)(1).
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bering.”54 Finally, it draws federal courts into the jurisdictional mayhem by subjecting the state commission’s approval or rejection of an
interconnection agreement to review by the federal courts. 55
A. The Role of the FCC
In 1996, the FCC promulgated rules implementing and interpreting various provisions of the Telecommunications Act. 56 These rules
gave rise to a number of challenges, which was not surprising given
the scope of state commissions’ authority prior to the Act and the
amount of intrusion the rules appear to make into areas of obviously
intrastate concern, such as pricing standards. All challenges to the
rules, initiated by both state commissions and ILECs, were ultimately consolidated into one proceeding in the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals. 57 In Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, the Eighth Circuit invalidated a number of the FCC’s rules, including the pricing standards, holding that the FCC has authority over interstate matters
only.58
The FCC, joined by AT&T and MCI, appealed the Eighth Circuit’s
decision, and the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue in 1999,
in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.59 The ILECs defended the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion, arguing that the FCC’s rulemaking authority extends only to interstate and foreign matters—and not to intrastate concerns. 60 The Eighth Circuit had held that 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)
would prevent FCC rulemaking in this area without express authority by the 1996 Act, which it found was not included in the Act. 61 Insisting that express authority was required, the ILECs argued that
the Act does not provide the FCC the necessary express jurisdictional

54. Id. § 251(e)(1).
55. See § 252(e)(6). After a determination by a state commission to approve or reject
an interconnection agreement, whether arbitrated or negotiated, “any party aggrieved by
such determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to dete rmine whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements” of sections 251 and 52
of the Act. Id.; see also Weiser, supra note 50, at 13-14. But see BellSouth Telecommuns.,
Inc. v. North Carolina Utils. Comm’n, 240 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that federal
courts may only review the final decisions by state commissions to approve or reject inte rconnection agreements; all other issues must be brought in state court).
56 See generally First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 4 Communications Reg. (P&F) 1 (Aug.
8, 1996) (codified in scattered sections of 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 20, 51, 90) [hereinafter First Report], 1996 WL 452885, summarized at 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476 (Aug. 29, 1996), 1996 WL
489810.
57. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 792 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting the earlier
consolidation), rev’d in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
58. Id. at 819.
59. 525 U.S. 366.
60. See id. at 374.
61. See id. at 375.
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grant.62 They also pointed out that the Act gives state commissions a
role in problem solving, and they argued that this limits the FCC’s
jurisdiction. 63 Finally, they argued that the FCC should not be given
power to review agreements that state commissions have approved.64
The Court rejected the jurisdictional arguments; it pointed to section 201(b) of the Act, which “gives the FCC jurisdiction to make
rules governing matters to which the 1996 Act applies.”65 Thus, the
FCC acted within its jurisdiction in making rules that regulate intrastate communications. 66 The Court explained that “Congress expressly directed that the 1996 Act, along with its local-competition
provisions [sections 251 and 252], be inserted into the Communications Act of 1934.”67 Further, section 251(i), created by the 1996 Act,
states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or
otherwise affect the [FCC]’s authority under section 201.”68 Consequently, the Court ruled that Congress took regulation of local telecommunications away from the States, and it was therefore within
the jurisdiction of the FCC to make rules regarding the regulation of
intrastate communications. 69 The Court swept away the ILECs’ other
arguments as well, to specifically hold that “the Commission has jurisdiction to design a pricing methodology” under section 252(d),
notwithstanding the role granted to state commissions in reviewing
prices: “It is the States that will apply those standards and implement that methodology . . . . That is enough . . . .”70
Thus, the Court embraced an interpretation of the 1996 Act that
offers the FCC a strong role in regulating in this area. This would
suggest that Congress intended that important portions of the Act be
interpreted in a uniform way, on a federal level. It also has implications for determining the proper role of state commissions. The next
section addresses this issue.
B. The Continuing Role of State Commissions
For the time being, the FCC’s jurisdiction is secure. Nonetheless,
there remain a number of important issues under the Act that are
not governed by FCC regulation. The pricing standard of section
252(d) and the reciprocal compensation requirement of section
62. The Court deemed this argument “academic” after rejecting the second argument.
See id. at 383.
63. See id. at 383-84.
64. The Court found this argument to be unripe, as no such event had yet occurred.
See id. at 386.
65. Id. at 380.
66. See id. at 379-80.
67. Id. at 377-78 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 201(b)).
68. 47 U.S.C. § 251(i).
69. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 378-79.
70. Id. at 384.
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251(b)(5) are two such examples. Without FCC guidance, state commissions arbitrating and/or reviewing interconnection agreements
are left to interpret these provisions on their own.
1. States’ Interpretation of the Act’s Pricing Provisions
After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Iowa Utilities Board, the
Eighth Circuit on remand again invalidated several FCC regulations,
including pricing regulations promulgated under section 252(d), this
time holding that the regulations were not reasonable interpretations of the Act. 71 Although courts must defer to interpretations of
federal law made by federal agencies, they are only required to do so
if the agency’s “interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of
the statute or is a reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute.”72 Applying this rule, the Eighth Circuit held that the FCC’s
pricing rules conflicted with the clear language of the Act. 73
Section 252(d)(1) states that pricing standards “may include a
reasonable profit,”74 but that they must be both nondiscriminatory 75
and “based on the cost . . . of providing the interconnection or network element.”76 The Act does not specify how to calculate the cost.
The FCC’s pricing rules would calculate cost using “a forward-looking
economic cost methodology that is based on the Total Element Longrun Incremental Cost (TELRIC) of the element.”77 This methodology
ties the costs for access charged to the carrier seeking entry to the
most efficient technology available in the industry, regardless of
what technology the ILEC actually possesses. 78 The Eighth Circuit
found this contradicted the clear meaning of the statute:
Congress intended the rates to be “based on the cost . . . of providing the interconnection or network element,” not on the cost some
imaginary carrier would incur by providing the newest, most efficient, and least cost substitute for the actual item or element
which will be furnished by the existing ILEC pursuant to Congress’s mandate for sharing. . . . Congress knew it was requiring
the existing ILECs to share their existing facilities and equipment
with new competitors . . . and it expressly said that the ILECs’

71. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 748 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.
Ct. 877-79 (Jan. 22, 2001).
72. Iowa Utils. Bd., 219 F.3d at 748-49 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
73. See id. at 749-50.
74. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(B).
75. See § 252(d)(1)(A)(ii).
76. Id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
77. Iowa Utils. Bd., 219 F.3d at 749 (explaining the FCC’s pricing standards); see also
47 C.F.R. § 51.505 (2000); First Order, supra note 56, at ¶ 685.
78. See sources cited supra note 77.
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costs of providing those facilities and that equipment were to be
recoverable by just and reasonable rates.79

While the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case, 80 it is
impossible to predict when a final ruling will come. In the meantime,
five years after the Telecommunications Act was enacted, 81 the FCC
still has no comprehensive body of regulations in place. The Eighth
Circuit’s decision thus only adds to the uncertainty and confusion.
Further, these invalidations may lead the FCC to delay issuance of
any new rules.
As a consequence, state commissions are not only implementing
the Act, but also interpreting it by making decisions ordinarily made
by the FCC. For example, after the Eighth Circuit stayed the FCC’s
pricing regulations in 1997 (before they ever took effect), the Florida
Public Service Commission (FPSC) interpreted the pricing provisions
of the Act for itself. 82 The FPSC “addressed the matter independently, without regard to the FCC regulations.”83 Indeed, the FPSC
ignored the FCC’s TELRIC pricing methodology, instead adopting its
own pricing methodology, “Total Service Long Run Incremental Cost”
(TSLRIC).84 While the FCC’s TELRIC based costs on a hypothetical,
efficient network that could be incorporated into existing facilities,
the FPSC’s methodology “uses the current network architecture and
future replacement technology as the basis for determining long-run
incremental cost.”85 The difference in interpretation is not insignificant, and the resulting confusion has predictably spawned litigation,
described more fully in Part V below. The point here is merely that
state commissions continue to interpret the provisions on their
own—which will, as later discussed, pose a problem for courts subjecting their decisions to review.
2. States’ Interpretation of the Act’s Reciprocal Compensation
Provisions
In addition to interpreting the Act’s pricing provisions, state
commissions have been left to interpret section 251 of the Act, which
(among other things) requires LECs “to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications.”86 When one LEC delivers traffic that originated on an79. Iowa Utils. Bd., 219 F.3d at 750 (citations omitted).
80. Verizon Communs., Inc. v. FCC, 121 S. Ct. 877 (Jan. 22, 2001).
81. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (Feb. 8, 1996).
82. See generally MCI Telecommuns. Corp. v. BellSouth Telecommuns., Inc., 112 F.
Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2000).
83. Id. at 1292 (explaining the FPSC’s reaction to Iowa Utils. Bd. v. Bell Atlantic
Corp., 120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5).

842

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:831

other LEC’s (the initiating LEC’s) networks, the delivering LEC
must be compensated for its costs. 87 Because an initiating LEC is
able to recoup the cost of transporting the call from the caller, but
the delivering LEC cannot, the initiating LEC must reimburse the
LEC that delivers the call—that is, it must provide “reciprocal compensation.”88
The FCC has construed the duty of reciprocal compensation to apply only to local traffic (compensation for long-distance traffic was
unaffected by the Act).89 This has created a question as to whether
calls bound for Internet service providers90 (“ISP-bound calls”) should
be considered “local” for reciprocal compensation purposes.
The FCC traditionally has looked to a call’s end point when determining its own jurisdiction (which did not extend to local communications before the 1996 Act) and “consistently has rejected attempts to divide communications at any intermediate points.”91 However, calls to an ISP do not end at that ISP’s local server; rather, they
move on to an Internet website often located in another state. 92 As
such, “a substantial portion of Internet traffic involves accessing interstate or foreign websites.”93 Despite the eventual endpoint of the
call, the initial ISP-bound portion of the call remains a local call,
prompting the FCC to declare ISP-bound traffic “jurisdictionally
mixed.”94 But this moniker does not address the problem that the initiating LEC incurs costs for which it is not compensated.95

87. See Illinois Bell Co. v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 1999)
(explaining the concept of reciprocal compensation), cert. granted in part sub nom. Mathias
v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1224 (Mar. 5, 2001).
88. Id.; see also Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen
a customer of LEC A calls a customer of LEC B, LEC A must pay LEC B for completing the
call, a cost usually paid on a per-minute basis.”).
89. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.701 (2000); First Report, supra note 56, at ¶ 7. The D.C. Circuit
explained:
LECs that originate or terminate long-distance calls continue to be compensated with “access charges,” as they were before the 1996 Act. Unlike reciprocal
compensation, these access charges are not paid by the originating LEC. Instead, the long-distance carrier itself pays both the LEC that originates the call
and links the caller to the long distance network, and the LEC that terminates
the call.
Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 4.
90. An Internet service provider (ISP) is a company that offers its customers the ability to obtain an Internet connection through the phone lines. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 179
F.3d at 569.
91. Declaratory Ruling, Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 17
Communications Reg. (P&F) 201, at ¶ 10 (Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Ruling], 1999
WL 98037, summarized at 64 Fed. Reg. 14,203 (proposed Mar. 24, 1999), 1999 WL 155163,
vacated and remanded, Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d 1.
92. See id. ¶ 18.
93. Id. ¶ 18.
94. Id. ¶ 19.
95. See id. ¶ 29.
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In a declaratory order adopted February 25, 1999, the FCC discussed the debate over reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic
and concluded that it would form a rule to govern these issues. 96
First, it determined that ISP-bound traffic was not in fact local; however, it gave state commissions the authority to interpret the matter
for themselves until promulgation of a rule.97 In addition to granting
parties the option of including reciprocal compensation provisions in
their interconnection agreements, the FCC gave state commissions
the authority, during arbitration proceedings, to construe agreements as requiring compensation. Moreover, “even when the agreements of interconnecting LECs include no linguistic hook for such a
requirement, the commissions can find that reciprocal compensation
is appropriate.”98
However, the D.C. Circuit eventually vacated and remanded the
FCC’s 1999 order. The court held that the FCC failed to adequately
explain how it reached its decision that a LEC’s terminated, ISPbound calls are not local. 99 Thus, state commissions are left to interpret this provision of the federal act as well without guidance from
the FCC.100
3. Summary
Despite the Supreme Court’s Iowa Utilities Board opinion, “the
content of the new regulatory model remains unclear.”101 Reciprocal
compensation and pricing methodology issues are just two examples
of the scope left for state commission interpretation of the Act. When
the Court had the opportunity to address whether courts should extend deference to state commission interpretations, it did not take it.
The Court noted that while it is well established that state officers
can interpret and apply federal law, 102 it knew of no similar instances
in which state administrative agencies could make federal policy. 103
However, instead of discussing the proper standard of review federal
district courts should apply, the Court simply pointed out the novelty
of “the attendant legal questions [that will arise from the Act],” in96. See id. ¶ 28.
97. See id.
98. Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also 1999 Ruling,
supra note 91, at ¶ 18.
99. See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 1.
100. [Editor’s Note: As this Note was going to publication, the FCC on remand promulgated a new rule. See Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 66 Fed. Reg.
26,800-01 (May 15, 2001) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 51). The new rule provides that
ISP-bound traffic is exempt from reciprocal compensation under the 1996 Act. See id. at
26,801. It also provides a pricing mechanism. See id. at 26,802-03.]
101. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 2212.
102. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 385 n.10 (citing United States v. Jones, 109 U.S.
513 (1883)).
103. See id.
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cluding the important question whether federal courts must defer to
interpretations of federal law by state commissions. 104
IV. WHAT LEVEL OF DEFERENCE SHOULD COURTS OWE STATE
COMMISSIONS WHEN T HEY INTERPRET THE ACT? T HE IMPORTANCE OF
DE NOVO REVIEW OF NON-FCC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE A CT
As Duane McLaughlin has pointed out, the legislative history of
the Act reveals three important policies:
(1) Congress intended there to be basic national standards to ensure that states would not be able to thwart competition, (2) Congress saw the FCC as the natural creator of these national standards, and (3) Congress intended to preserve a significant role for
the states in assuring that the implementation would conform to
local needs and conditions.105

This raises the question of whether a de novo standard or an arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review best promotes the Act’s
goals. In Iowa Utilities Board, the Supreme Court stated that it is
“aware of no similar instances in which federal policymaking has
been turned over to state administrative agencies.”106 This important
statement appears to point in favor of de novo review. Indeed, a recent district court opinion, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.,107 provides extensive reasoning for
applying a de novo standard to issues of interpretation.108 The court
explained why courts should not give a state agency’s interpretation
of a federal act the same level of deference that it gives a federal
agency’s interpretation:
State commissions have no special expertise in interpreting federal
statutes and no authority to make federal law. Federal courts are
or should be at least as adept as state commissions in interpreting
federal statutes. There is thus far less reason for deference to state
commissions on issues of the meaning and import of the Act, and it
makes sense for district courts to address such issues de novo, as
Congress apparently intended.109

104. Id.
105. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 2236.
106. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 385.
107. 112 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2000).
108. Id. at 1290-91.
109. Id. at 1291 (comparing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), with Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep’t of Social Servs.,
879 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1989)). The court explained that it would “review de novo issues
regarding the meaning and import of the Telecommunications Act and will review the Florida Commission’s determinations of how to implement the Act as so construed only under
the arbitrary and capricious standard.” Id.
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Moreover, the court read section 252(e)(6) of the Act, which designates federal district courts as the proper authority to review decisions made by state commissions, as requiring de novo review of
state commissions’ interpretations of the Act, but requiring deference
in all other instances. 110
However, some have argued that de novo review exposes federal
courts to a number of risks. Professor Weiser has summarized the
three greatest risks:
(1) causing bad results through their involvement in policy decisions for which they are ill-suited; (2) damaging their perceived legitimacy if they are seen as making pure policy decisions; and (3)
acting undemocratically by depriving accountable policymakers of
the opportunity to make such decisions.111

Further, he suggests that employing an arbitrary-and-capricious
standard will increase interstate competition. 112 By deferring to state
agencies, courts can increase “individual tailoring by and competition
between different states in implementing a federal statute,”113 as
each state will attempt to tailor the Act to best fit its local conditions. 114 Secondary benefits include the promotion of state autonomy,
local participation, and greater accountability. 115 Furthermore, the
implementation of the Act would “rely on the economy of local agencies (rather than creating or expanding a new national bureaucracy).”116 It is also true that a more deferential standard would promote at least one important goal of the Act by giving the states a significant role in implementing standards that conform to local needs
and conditions. However, of all the arguments touting the benefits of
a deferential standard, the most important include increased competition and state experimentation.117
Yet, while it seems logical that innovations in problem solving will
result when fifty different state governments interpret and implement an act, innovation has not in fact been a byproduct of “cooperative federalism” under the Telecommunications Act. The debate over
reciprocal compensation 118 provides an example: In industries like
110. See id. at 1291.
111. Weiser, supra note 50, at 28.
112. See id. at 3.
113. Id. at 23.
114. See id. at 36 (explaining that giving states such an active role in implementing the
Act “allow[ed] Congress to pursue a policy of diversity and experimentation within a federal scheme”).
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. See id.; Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV . 317, 397 (1997)
(stating that the benefits of using states as laboratories is one of the primary reasons for
advocating a decentralized government).
118. See generally, e.g., U.S. West Communs. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 193 F.3d 1112,
1117 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999) (listing as one issue to be reviewed under a de novo standard a
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telecommunications, states have been reluctant to experiment. As of
January 2000, seventeen state public utilities commissions had addressed whether reciprocal compensation should apply to calls to ISP
traffic.119 As described above, in its now vacated 1999 ruling, the FCC
had explained that the states were free (until the issuance of an FCC
rule) to adopt another method of compensation. 120 The FCC explicitly
assured states that the FCC has the ultimate authority, as ISPtraffic is substantially interstate, but that some form of compensation is certainly appropriate. 121 Yet only New Jersey decided that reciprocal compensation does not apply to ISP-bound traffic.122 The fact
that no state took the initiative to develop innovations in the methods of compensation typically used shows that cooperative federalism
does not necessarily breed experimentation. As Susan RoseAckerman has explained, the decentralized government that results
from cooperative federalism “can create additional disincentives for
innovative activity because of spillovers and the lack of sorting by
risk preferences.”123
Furthermore, any benefits that might flow from innovation and
experimentation are far outweighed by the danger created when allowing each state to interpret the federal Act on its own.124 It is im-

commission’s determination that reciprocal compensation was due for ISP-bound traffic),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1284 (June 29, 2000).
119. See Pacific Bell, Application 98-11-024 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n June 24, 1999)
(arbitration proceeding); Global NAPs South, Docket No. 98-540 (Del. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
Mar. 9, 1999) (same); Pac-West Telecomm., Inc., Docket No. 98-10015 (Nev. Pub. Util.
Comm’n Mar. 4, 1999) (same); Global NAPs, Inc., Docket No. TO98070426 (N.J. Bd. of Pub.
Util. July 12, 1999); Electric Lightwave, Inc., Order No. 99-218, ARB 91 (Or. Pub. Util.
Comm’n Mar. 17, 1999) (same); Nextlink Tenn., L.L.C., Docket No. 98-00123 (Tenn. Reg.
Auth., May 18, 1999) (same); WorldCom v. GTE Northwest, Docket No. UT-980338 (Wash.
Util. & Trans. Comm’n May 12, 1999) (same); ICG Telecom Group, Docket 26619 (Ala. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n March 4, 1999) (interpretation of a preexisting agreement); Intermedia
Comm., Inc., v. GTE Florida, Inc., Docket No. 980986-TP (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 30,
1999) (same); Time Warner Communs, v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Cause No. 41097 (Ind. Util.
Reg. Comm’n June 9, 1999) (same); MFS Intelenet v. Bell Atlantic, Case No. 8731 (Md.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 11, 1999) (same); U.S. West Communs., Inc., Docket No. P-421/M99-529 (Mn. Pub. Util. Comm’n Aug. 17, 1999) (same); ICG TelecomGroup, Inc. v. Ameritech Ohio, Case No. 97-1557-TP-CSS (Oh. Pub. Util. Comm’n May 5, 1999) (same); NEVD
of Rhode Island, L.L.C., Docket No. 2935 (R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n July 21, 1999) (same);
GTE Hawaiian Tel. Co., Docket No. 99-0067 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n May 6, 1999) (declaratory statement); Opinion Concerning Reciprocal Compensation, Case No. 99-C-0529
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Aug. 26, 1999) (same); Adoption of Partial Settlement, No. P00991648 (Penn. Pub. Util. Comm’n Aug. 26, 1999) (same).
120. See 1999 Ruling, supra note 91, at ¶ 27.
121. See id.
122. See Global NAPs, Inc., Docket No. TO98070426 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. July 12,
1999).
123. Susan Rose -Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEG. STUDIES 593 (1980).
124. But see Weiser, supra note 50, at 3-4 (“[C]omplete uniformity in the implementation of cooperative federalism statutes is both an undesirable and unattainable goal, as the
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portant that federal courts not defer to state agencies. By not deferring, Federal courts promote uniformity in the interpretation of the
law, offer regulated parties certainty and predictability, and keep the
cost of legal battles low. Even if certain involved parties “would benefit marginally by having a myriad of local statutes,”125 the benefits do
not necessarily outweigh the associated transaction costs.
If courts were to defer to state agencies, it would eliminate uniform interpretation and application of federal law.126 Though courts
have generally deferred to federal agencies, they have done so on the
basis that federal agencies can contribute to the uniformity of federal
law, whereas state agencies cannot. 127 In fact, the Supreme Court
stated in Iowa Utilities Board that there is a presumption that “a
federal program administered by 50 independent state agencies is
surpassing strange.”128 It would be even stranger in the telecommunications industry, in which the same parties frequently debate the
same issues in multiple states.
Generally, market participants prefer regulations that “emanate
from the center,”129 because increased uniformity promotes lower
costs. As has been pointed out with regard to legislation, even where
federal regulation may be “stricter than what the states might have
adopted, the transaction costs of fighting fifty . . . battles, only to
comply with fifty different . . . schemes, [make] it attractive to submit
to national control.”130 These types of considerations are equally true
of the need for uniform interpretation of the laws. It would do the
parties little good to have one, uniform body of federal law interpreted fifty different ways. This applies especially to the telecommunications industry, where the same LECs often compete in many different states. 131
costs of intrusive judicial review are considerable, and there are important benefits that
come from experimentation and interstate competition.”).
125. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV . 265,
271 (1990) (explaining that interest groups would often prefer the passage of a federal law
over the passage of separate state statutes, due to the high costs “associated with obtaining
passage of all those statutes”).
126. See, e.g., Amisub, Inc. v. Colorado Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 795-96 (10th
Cir. 1989); Turner v. Perales, 869 F.2d 140, 141 (2d. Cir. 1989).
127. See Weiser, supra note 50, at 20-21.
128. AT&T Co. v. Iowa Utils. Board, 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1996).
129. Friedman, supra note 117, at 374.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Teligent, About Us, at http://www.teligent.com/docs/aboutus.html (last
visited May 20, 2001) (stating that Teligent’s does business in over 40 local markets); see
also KMC Telecom, The 1, at http://www.kmctelecom.com/cities/index.cfm?fuseaction=map
(last visited May 20, 2001) (40 cities); e.spire Communications, Press Releases, at
http://www.espire.com/press/index.cfm (last visited May 20, 2001) (38 cities);
ITC^DeltaCom, Fiber Network, at http://www.itcdeltacom.com/network.html (last visited
May 20, 2001) (10 states); ICG Communications, Profile: Office Locations, at
http://www.icgcomm.com/profile/locations.asp (last visited May 20, 2001) (9 states); Global

848

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:831

The need for certainty in the law is particularly important when
the law is designed to facilitate market entry by new participants.
This idea has been recognized by the FCC. In its Third Report and
Order on implementing the Act, 132 the FCC delineated factors to be
considered in evaluating what network elements ILECs are obligated
to share with market entrants. One of these factors was “certainty in
the market,”133 or specifically “how the unbundling obligations [the
FCC] adopt[s] can provide the uniformity and predictability that new
entrants and fledging competitors need to develop national and regional business plans.”134 Thus, courts ought to resist applying a deferential standard to interpret state commissions’ interpretations of
the act and turn instead to de novo review.
V. THE HIX S TANDARD AND THE FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN
NEGOTIATED AND ARBITRATED AGREEMENTS
Case law reveals that while the federal courts theoretically apply
de novo review to state commissions’ interpretations of the Act, in
many instances they are in fact using a more deferential standard.
The question of the suitable level of deference to commissions’ decisions was first addressed in a 1997 federal district court opinion,
U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Hix.135 In the absence of Supreme
Court guidance, the Hix test continues to be applied by other District
Courts and even Circuit Courts. 136 The Hix court decided “the appropriate standard of review to be applied to [state commissions’] decision[s] approving certain interconnection agreements.”137 The court
detailed a two-part inquiry to guide a court’s review of state commissions’ decisions. 138

NAPs, Sites, at http://www.gnaps.com/sites.html (last visited May 20, 2001) (six states plus
Washington, D.C.); Focal Communications Corporation, Overview, at http://www.focal.com/
about (last visited May 20, 2001) (21 cities; 15 states plus Washington, D.C.).
132. Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15
F.C.C. Record 3696 (Nov. 5, 1999), 1999 WL 1008985, order modified, Supplemental Order,
18 Communications Reg. (P&F) 1041 (Nov. 24, 1999), 1999 WL 1065185, and order clarified Supplemental Order Clarification, 15 F.C.C. Record 9587 (June 2, 2000), 2000 WL
713746.
133. Id. at ¶ 15.
134. Id.
135. 986 F. Supp 13 (D. Colo. 1997).
136. See U.S. West Communs. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 193 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir.
1999); MCI Telecommuns. Co. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 768, 773 (E.D.
Mich. 1999); U.S. West Communs., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1286
(D. Utah 1999); AT&T Communs. of the Southwest, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 86
F. Supp. 2d 932 (W.D. Mo. 1999); MCI Telecommuns. Co. v. BellSouth Telecommuns., Inc.,
7 F. Supp. 2d 674, 678 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (“The court’s standard of review in considering
these matters was set forth in [Hix].”).
137. Hix, 986 F. Supp. at 14.
138. See id. at 18.
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Under the Hix test, the court must first determine whether the
commission’s decision “procedurally and substantively” adheres to
the Act. 139 Because this is a question of law, the Hix court stated that
it is subject to de novo review in federal court.140 If the reviewing
court finds that the commission acted in compliance with the Act, it
is then to review all remaining issues under an arbitrary-andcapricious standard.141 The Hix court elaborated that the rule it developed does not rely on technical distinctions between “questions of
law” and “questions of fact.”142 Instead, the court insisted that the
critical question is whether the issue involves procedural or substantive compliance with the Act. 143 Essentially, under the proceduraland-substantive-compliance classification delineated in Hix, the only
issue courts are to review de novo is whether commissions’ decisions
comply with the Act. 144 For instance, the Act outlines some factors
the commission should consider before approving or rejecting the interconnection agreement. 145
But Hix’s classification is problematic. While courts act appropriately when they apply the Hix standard to negotiated agreements,
applying the Hix standard to arbitrated agreements is completely
improper. The difference in the appropriate levels of deference hinges
on the different factors state commissions use when approving negotiated and arbitrated agreements. 146 Few courts have acknowledged
the distinction between arbitrated and negotiated agreements; 147
nonetheless, they generally acknowledge that the level of appropriate

139. Id. at 18-19.
140. See id. at 18 (quoting Colorado Health Care Ass’n v. Colorado Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
842 F.2d 1158, 1165 (10th Cir. 1998)).
141. See id. (explaining that the arbitrary-and-capricious standard is “highly deferential; the agency’s action is presumed valid if a reasonable basis exists for its decision,” and
citing Amisub, Inc. v. Colorado Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 879 F.2d 789, 800 (10th Cir. 1989)).
142. Id. at 19 (ordering the parties to “avoid use of those labels in arguing how the
standard of review applies to the specific issues”).
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(e)(2)(A)(i-ii).
146. Despite the fact that decisions by arbitrators are generally afforded a high level of
deference, “the appropriate standard derives from that ordinarily applicable to judicial review of administrative decisions, not arbitration decisions.” MCI Telecommuns. Corp. v.
BellSouth Telecommuns., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1291 n.7 (N.D. Fla. 2000).
147. But see Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 2001
WL 123663 (4th Cir. 2001). The court explained:
While [the Act] authorizes review of § 252 arbitration determinations ultimately leading to the formation of interconnection agreements, in the final
analysis, the State commission determinations under § 252 involve only approval or rejection of such agreements. With respect to negotiated agreements
in particular, the federal review is narrower. The only “determination” that can
be made by the State commission under § 252 on a negotiated agreement is a
determination to approve or reject it . . . .
Id. at **21 (footnote omitted).
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deference depends on whether the issue is one of interpretation or
implementation.
For example, the court in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. BellSouth Telecommunications148 explained that “district court review of
the meaning and import of the Telecommunications Act should be de
novo and that, when acting in conformance with a correct interpretation of the Act, state commissions have broad discretion reviewable
only under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.”149 While the Hix
standard intends to promote this idea, it fails to do so by overlooking
the important distinction between negotiated and arbitrated agreements. When a commission has arbitrated an agreement under “a
correct interpretation of the Act,”150 its approval or rejection of the
agreement should be given deferential treatment. However, even under this standard, the court must first evaluate whether the commission in fact correctly interpreted the Act. This is even more true
when the court is reviewing an arbitrated agreement.
Courts are skipping this inquiry entirely. Instead, they begin with
a deferential view of the commissions’ actions and, apparently, a presumption that the commissions are correctly interpreting the Act.
MCI Communications and a later case before the same court illustrate. In MCI Communications, MCI challenged the Florida Commission’s (FPSC’s) pricing methodology (TSLRIC) described in Part III
above, arguing that it should mirror the FCC’s methodology
(TELRIC).151 The FPSC had imposed this methodology during an arbitration of an interconnection agreement between MCI and BellSouth.152 The U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Florida
noted that the Act does not address whether TSLRIC or TELRIC
provides the proper pricing methodology and that valid arguments
existed for either methodology:
Nothing in the Telecommunications Act specifies which of these
two methodologies must be followed. . . . This is, therefore, an issue
on which the appropriate administrative agency’s adoption of either methodology would survive judicial review under the applicable arbitrary and capricious standard.
. . . Had [the Eighth Circuit’s initial invalidation of the FCC
rules] remained intact [following appeal to the Supreme Court],

148. 112 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2000).
149. Id. at 1290 (basing this standard on “the statutory language, the standards generally applicable to judicial review of administrative action, the apparent purpose of involving state commissions in this process while providing for federal district court review
of their decisions, and the emerging case law under the Act”). The court noted, “This accords with the consistent approach of courts that have addressed this issue under the Act.”
Id. at 1291-92 (citing, among others, Hix).
150. Id. at 1290.
151. See id. at 1286.
152. See id. at 1289.
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the Florida Commission’s adoption of TSLRIC would have been
unassailable.153

However, the court invalidated FPSC’s adoption of TSLRIC because
it conflicted with the FCC’s rules. 154
Shortly after the MCI decision, the Eighth Circuit again invalidated the FCC rules that relied on TELRIC.155 Thus, less than four
months after MCI, Florida’s pricing provisions were again before the
court; in AT&T Communications of the Southern States, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, the same federal district court in Florida
readdressed the validity of TSLRIC—and this time upheld it. 156 With
all conflicting FCC rules invalidated by the Eighth Circuit, the court
deferred to the FPSC’s decision.157
The AT&T court stressed, as it had noted in MCI, that there was
nothing unreasonable about the FPSC’s methodology.158 Given the
Eighth Circuit’s finding that the FCC’s methodology violated the
plain meaning of the Act, this is not too surprising. What is striking
is not that AT&T upheld the FPSC’s methodology, but how.
The court explicitly referred to the methodology as “an . . . interpretation of the Act.”159 One might have expected this to lead to de
novo review. In fact, the court had formulated its standard of review
this way: “I will review de novo issues regarding the meaning and
import of the Telecommunications Act, and I will review state commission determinations of how to implement the Act as so construed
only under the arbitrary and capricious standard.”160 Yet in upholding the TSLRIC approach, the court characterized it as “an acceptable administrative interpretation of the Act that would survive review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. . . . [The] methodology does not violate the Act and is not arbitrary and capricious.”161
MCI and AT&T reflect the confusion that has been generated by
application of the Hix test to arbitrated agreements. The Hix standard, in theory, provides courts with an opportunity to evaluate the
commissions’ interpretation of the Act by applying a de novo stan153. Id. at 1292.
154. See id. at 1290.
155. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 748 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.
Ct. 877-79 (Jan. 22, 2001). “Technically, [the Eighth Circuit’s ruling to invalidate the FCC
regulations] leaves the situation as if the FCC had adopted no regulations at all.” AT&T
Communs. of the Southern States, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommuns., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1305,
1311 n.5 (N.D. Fla. 2000) (declining to address whether the Eighth Circuit’s decision would
be binding in this situation).
156. AT&T Communs., 122 F. Supp. at 1310.
157. See id. at 1311 (“But for the FCC’s regulations, I would have upheld the Florida
Commission’s decision from the outset.”).
158. See id. at 1311.
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 1309.
161. Id. at 1311.
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dard to issues of procedural and substantive compliance. However, in
practice this is not happening because courts, including the Hix
court, have not been separating these two elements. Once the court
decides that a state commission followed the Act’s procedural requirements to approve or reject the agreement in light of specified
factors, the court does not question whether the commission’s consideration of the factors substantively complied with the Act. Instead,
courts defer by using an arbitrary-and-capricious standard when assessing how the commission considered the factors. However, there
are significant distinctions between the two.
When reviewing a negotiated agreement, as described above, the
state commission can only consider whether the agreement “discriminates against a telecommunications carrier not a party to the
agreement”162 and whether “implementation of such agreement . . . is
not consistent with the public interest, convenience and necessity.” 163
Under Hix, the court reviews de novo whether the commission procedurally and substantively complied with the above regulation. So
long as the commission considered possible discrimination against
other carriers and the public’s interest, the court must affirm the
commission’s decision. Any additional questions, including the commission’s decision regarding those factors, are reviewed under the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The factors used by state commissions to evaluate negotiated agreements do not require them to interpret the Act. As a result, when courts defer to the commissions,
they are deferring on questions of implementation only. Thus, the arbitrary-and-capricious standard makes sense.
However, in arbitration cases, state commissions actually interpret the Act. In reviewing arbitrated agreements, the Act requires
state commissions to assess whether they meet the requirements of
section 251 (the section outlining the LECs’ duties), the FCC rules
promulgating the Act—and the pricing standard of section 252(d).164
It was this latter standard that was at issue in the AT&T and MCI
cases. Under the Hix standard, courts should initially decide, under a
de novo standard, whether the commission considered these factors.
But according to Hix, courts must then use the “highly deferential” 165
arbitrary-and-capricious standard to review how the commissions
considered these factors. What this standard overlooks is that the
commission must also first determine what the factors are; where the
statutory standards are unclear, the commission, using its own
judgment, must give them content before it can consider them. Thus,
when a court defers to a state commission’s assessment of whether
162.
163.
164.
165.

47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(2)(A)(i).
Id. § 252(e)(2)(A)(ii).
See id. § 252(e)(B).
Hix, 986 F. Supp. at 18.
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an arbitrated agreement complies with the Act, in all practicality the
court is deferring to the state commission’s own interpretation of the
Act.
As noted above, the courts’ own articulation of the standard of review suggests that state agencies are not supposed to be left to their
own devices in formulating interpretations of federal law. Yet the
case law suggests that the courts, perhaps understandably reluctant
to venture into areas outside their expertise, have been doing just
that. State commission review of arbitrated agreements inherently
requires interpretations of the Act; when the FCC has provided none
(or it has, but the courts have repudiated them) and the courts have
provided none, then the commissions cannot avoid providing them
themselves. According deference to these kinds of commission determinations, however, can never create the kind of uniformity that is
needed in area like this one. The Hix standard ought to be revised to
account for this fact by requiring courts to review commission decisions involving arbitrated agreements under more rigorous standards.
VI. CONCLUSION
As Justice Scalia explained, “there is no doubt . . . that if the federal courts believe a state commission is not regulating in accordance
with federal policy they may bring it to heel.”166 However, for courts
to ever determine this, they must reformulate the Hix test and consider arbitrated interconnection agreements under a de novo standard. As evidenced by the reciprocal compensation and pricing methodology situations, state commissions inevitably interpret the Act in
the absence of FCC regulations.
To require federal courts to defer to state interpretations sacrifices uniformity, and a uniform interpretation of the Telecommunications Act is essential to promote competition in the local telephone
sector. The only way that this can occur is if courts review appeals of
arbitrated interconnection agreements under a de novo standard of
review. Deference to state commissions’ decisions results in inconsistent interpretation of the Act.
Courts’ applications of Hix’s standard of review guidelines are
dangerous, because they fail to distinguish between arbitrated
agreements and negotiated agreements. When arbitrating disputed
issues, the commissions, for all practical purposes, are interpreting
the Act. These interpretations take effect because courts continue to
claim that they are imposing de novo review on matters regarding
“the meaning” of the Act, when truly they are deferring to state
agencies on important questions of interpretation.
166. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 379 n.6 (1999).
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If courts continue to apply Hix in this manner, Congress will need
to revisit the Act and specify that a de novo standard must be used in
appeals of arbitrated agreements. Federal courts should not be permitted to defer to state commissions’ interpretation of a federal act.
Otherwise, the ultimate goal of competition for the consumers’ benefit will be at best delayed, at worst sacrificed.

